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ABSTRACT
The choice of a college major plays a critical role in determining the future earnings of college graduates.
Students make their college major decisions in part due to the future earnings streams associated with
the different majors. We survey students about what their expected earnings would be both in the major
they have chosen and in counterfactual majors. We also elicit students’ subjective assessments of their
abilities in chosen and counterfactual majors. We estimate a model of college major choice that incorporates
these subjective expectations and assessments. We show that both expected earnings and students’
abilities in the different majors are important determinants of student’s choice of a college major. We
also show that students’ forecast errors with respect to expected earnings in different majors is potentially





















Numerous studies have documented large diﬀerences in earnings across diﬀerent college majors.1
For example, Grogger and Eide (1995) ﬁnd that one-quarter of the change in the college wage
premium for men was driven by a shift from low-paying to high-paying majors. And, James,
Nabeel, Conaty and To (1989, p. 252) argue that “while sending your child to Harvard appears
to be a good investment, sending him to your local state university to major in Engineering, to
take lots of math, and preferably to attain a high GPA, is an even better private investment.”
Given these large earnings diﬀerences across majors, economists have analyzed the extent to
which students sort into majors as a function of such diﬀerences.2 At the same time, diﬀerences
in student ability and aptitudes also have been found to inﬂuence choice of college majors. For
example, Turner and Brown (1999) provide evidence of ability sorting across majors by SAT
scores, and Paglin and Rufolo (1990) argue that the diﬀerence in the mathematical ability is the
main reason for the diﬀerence in the major choice and earnings between male and female.3
In this paper, we examine the factors that inﬂuence college major choice. Borrowing from
standard economic models of schooling decisions (Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967; Mincer, 1974),
we model the choice of a college major by comparing the returns to diﬀerent majors with the costs
associated with completing them. As noted above, economists typically focus on the expected
earnings streams that result from diﬀerent educational choices to measure their returns. In the
context of majors, such earnings streams are, themselves, associated with alternative careers,
or occupations, that majoring in a particular subject make more or less likely. For example,
majoring in biology (or pre-med) is likely to aﬀect one’s chances of becoming a medical doctor
and realizing the earnings stream associated with a career in medicine. With respect to the
costs of schooling, economic models tend to focus on a student’s ability or abilities to complete
years of schooling more eﬃciently and eﬀectively. Finally, some models of schooling decisions
emphasize the consumption value of education, as students may enjoy the content of courses in
some majors more than others and/or ﬁnd the career paths associated with particular majors
to be more enjoyable than others.
One of the key problems in implementing and assessing models of educational choices, in-
cluding that for majors, is the lack of data on the constructs of such models. In particular,
one typically does not directly observe a student’s expected earnings associated with alternative
majors or in their abilities in diﬀerent majors. Rather, economists typically have, at best, data
on the earnings streams for majors that are actually chosen. After dealing with selection issues,
economists need to make strong assumptions about how students form expectations for earnings
across these diﬀerent educational paths in order to estimate their choice models. Furthermore,
researchers often have only limited information on students’ relative abilities outside their chosen
majors. Again, assumptions must be invoked for what a student’s ability would be in majors
not chosen.
To address the issue of students’ expectations of earning across diﬀerent major-career com-
1See Daymont and Andrisani (1984); Hamermesh and Donald (2008); Grogger and Eide (1995); James, Nabeel,
Conaty and To (1989); Loury (1997); Loury and Garman (1995).
2See for example Arcidiacono (2004, 2005) and Montmarquette, Cannings and Mahseredjian (2002).
3We note that this ability sorting explanation seems less able to explain the underrepresentation of women in
more lucrative majors, as researchers (Friedman, 1989; Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006) have found that the
gender gap in math and science aptitude is small and has decreased for several decades.
1binations, we conducted a survey of male undergraduates at Duke University. We elicited from
each student the probabilities he would be in particular careers in the future as well as they
earnings he might expect to earn in them. Students were asked these questions both for the
major they actually chose as well as for the other majors they could have chosen but did not,
i.e., for their counterfactual majors. In addition, we asked students to provide information about
their relative abilities in their own and all other possible majors.
An obvious potential concern with the elicitation of such information, especially with respect
to their expectations about future careers and earnings associated with them, is the accuracy
of these forecasts. Students may not have a very good idea of such phenomena, especially for
majors they have not chosen, and, thus, their forecasts of earnings may be subject to forecast
errors. Such errors may be more of an issue for students early in their college careers, i.e.,
freshmen and sophomores, relative to those who are closer to completing their degrees and closer
to having to make career decisions, i.e., juniors and seniors. To get a sense of the importance
of such forecast errors and how they may diﬀer across students, we also elicited from students
their expectations on how much the average Duke student would make in diﬀerent major-career
combinations. To the extent that all students have the same information about what careers
associated with diﬀerent majors would pay in the future, we should not ﬁnd any diﬀerences in
these expectations for the average Duke student, consistent with no forecast errors.4
Based on a simple characterizations of the data from our survey, we ﬁnd evidence of sorting
on the basis of both expected earnings and ability. With the exception of the lowest paying
majors, most students state their expected earnings are highest (or second highest) in the major
they actually chose. At the same time, the majority of students indicate that they expect their
earnings to be higher or at least as high if they had majored (or are majoring) in economics.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd clear evidence of ability sorting as the students in our study are much more
likely to state that they are more able (more competitive) in the major that they choose relative
to the ones they did not. To disentangle the relative importance of ability and expected earnings
on the choice of major, we formulate and estimate a model of major choice while also allowing
for diﬀerent preferences over careers. Our model-based estimates clearly indicate that expected
earnings do matter for student’s choice of major, even after controlling for ability and career
preferences. For example, a one standard deviation increase in business careers shifts the fraction
of students choosing economics from 19.7% to 22.9%, a sixteen percent increase. Although there
is sorting on expected earnings, our evidence indicates that students prefer majors that they are
good (or more able) at, which is consistent with the ﬁndings in Arcidiacono (2004). Equalizing
student abilities across majors would drop the fraction of humanities majors from 9.3% to 5.9%
while increasing the fraction of economics majors to 23.8%.
Expectations over future earnings are likely to be subject to forecast errors. For example,
individuals have diﬀering expectations regarding the market returns to particular ﬁelds. To
understand how these expectations diﬀer across students of diﬀerent majors, we asked students
what the average Duke student would make in diﬀerent majors. These assessments suggest that
students think the market premium is higher for their own major compared to those for majors
they did not choose. We show under what assumptions we can purge the student’s expected
earnings of measurement error and use our model to forecast the major choices of the students
with expected earnings free of the forecast error. We estimate that over 7.5% of students would
4Obviously, ﬁnding that students have the same assessments of the earnings and career expectations for the
average Duke student also is consistent with all students having a common, but non-zero, forecast error.
2switch majors if this forecast error was not present. Thus, our results suggest an important role
for informational diﬀerences in modeling the choice of college major and, given our evidence
of heterogeneity in the resulting forecast errors, of the importance of eliciting information on
expectations from survey respondents.
Our work ﬁts into a large and growing literature on the use of subjective expectations.5 More
recently, work has begun to incorporate subjective expectations into models of choice behavior.6
Our work builds on the recent literature of Delavande (2008), Kaufman (2009), and Zafar (2008,
2009) who use counterfactual expectations of choice models. Of particular relevance to our work
is Zafar (2008, 2009), who also examines counterfactual expectations and the choice of major.
Zafar (2008) focuses on gender diﬀerences in the choice of major while Zafar (2009) examines
the how expectations change over time regarding major ﬁt and the probability of graduating
conditional on major choice. Zafar’s work ﬁnds no evidence of expected earning aﬀecting the
choice of major. Zafar’s work was very informative in our own survey design. By linking majors
to careers, we sought to obtain more accurate measures of the students’ expected earnings across
majors. In addition, we drew a larger sample than Zafar and limited it to one gender (men)
in an attempt to minimize the potential for ﬁnding insigniﬁcant eﬀects of expected income, or
other measures, on students’ choice of a major due to low statistical power in estimation.7
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe a simple model of major
choice that motivates the survey design. In Section 3, we describe the data we collected in our
survey and present a descriptive analysis of these data, showing the sorting patterns on both
expected earnings and ability. In Section 4, we develop an empirical model of the choice of college
major where expected income at only one point in time is suﬃcient for estimation. In Section 5,
we present the estimation results and examine how changing abilities and earnings would aﬀect
the choice of major. In Section 6, we formulate a model of how to extract expectation error from
expected earnings and then show how removing this error would aﬀect major choice. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Modeling College Major Choice
To help motivate our data collection, we ﬁrst sketch a model of college major choice. As implied
by most models of human capital production (Ben-Porath, 1967), we assume that individuals
specialize in college early in the life cycle and then enter working careers for the remainder of
their lives. While in college, we assume that individuals choose from among J majors based upon
the beneﬁts and costs received while in college, as well as the subsequent returns in the labor
market careers associated with the choice of a major. The in-college ﬂow utility is a function
of the ith individual’s abilities in a given major, Aij, as well as their preferences for studying
particular subjects, ξij. Denote the in-school utility of individual i from choosing major j as
5This literature begins with the seminal work of Manski (1993a) and Dominitz and Manski (1996, 1997). Also
see Manski (2004).
6See van der Klaauw (2000), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Manski, Blass and Lach (forthcoming).
For an early discussion on incorporating subjective expectations into choice models, see Manski (1999) and Wolpin
(1999).
7Zafar’s sample consisted of 161 students, of which 92 were women and 69 were men. We gathered data on
173 students, all of whom were men, giving us a sample that is over 2.5 times larger than that used by Zafar to
estimate his college choice model for men.
3u(Aij,ξij).
Students trade oﬀ this current utility with the expected value of future utility associated with
choosing major j, EVij. This expected utility embeds a student’s expectations about K possible
careers that they may end up in, conditional on a given major and the expected payoﬀs from
such careers. Let Pijk denote the probability of ending up in career k, conditional on major j for
the ith individual and let EVijk denote the corresponding expected value of the career-speciﬁc
value function. As for the expected payoﬀs from careers, we focus on the expected earnings
associated with diﬀerent major-career combinations, Yijk. Finally, we assume that the student







where β is the discount rate.
In our survey, we elicited from students their subjective expectations of each component of
the above model of college major choice. Namely, we elicited measures of each student’s abilities
(Aij), the probabilities of their entering alternative careers, conditional on their pursuing each
of the J majors (Pijk), as well as the corresponding earnings for each of the J × K major-
career combinations (Yijk). We also asked students to provide us with direct assessments of
their preference orderings over all of the J possible majors. In Section 4, we discuss how we use
these orderings to produce one set of estimates of an empirical model of college major choice.
The above model of college choice abstracts from a number of considerations. First, we
assume that students make a one-time decision about their college major. In fact, students
may change their majors over the course of their college careers. As discussed in Kang (2009),
we did ask students about any changes they made in their major since coming to Duke. Less
than 20% of the (male) students in our survey had changed their majors, with most of these
changes reported by upper-classmen (juniors and seniors). Second, we ignore the possibility
that students may continue their education by seeking post-baccalaureate degrees. Again, we
asked students about their plans for continuing their educations and we found that almost all
of the Duke students we surveyed (91%) planned to seek an advanced degree. Given this high
percentage, we do not try to model attending graduate school in this paper.8 However, we expect
that students factored in graduate school in the probabilities and expected earnings we elicited
from them about careers (e.g., a career in Law is likely to require going to law school). Third,
the above 2-period model does not allow for the possibility that earnings in careers, and careers
themselves, might be expected to change over a student’s life cycle. With respect to careers, we
asked students to provide expectations about broad careers, rather than narrow occupations, in
an attempt to mitigate planned occupation switching. In what follows, we focus our attention
on students’ expected earnings 10 years out from graduation and, in Section 4, we outline a set
of simplifying assumptions under which we only need a forecast for a single year in the future.
Finally, we note that the above model assumes that, per se, careers are not chosen, but occur
at random, conditional on the choice of a major. While not developed in this paper, the data
we have gathered on career probabilities and expected earnings can be used to estimate a more
general model of college major and career choice than is considered herein.
8Furthermore, the fact that most students in our sample plan to go to graduate school seriously compromises
what we can learn from students’ responses to our questions about their earnings expectations one year after
graduating from Duke. Accordingly, we focus our analysis in this paper on students responses to questions about
their expectations about earnings 10 years after graduating from Duke.
43 Data from Survey of Duke Undergraduates
We administered a survey of male undergraduate students at Duke University between February
and April in 2009. Gender was the only restriction on sample recruitment; students from any
major, class or race were eligible to participate in the survey. We recruited our sample members
by posting ﬂyers around the Duke campus about our study. Surveys were administered on
computers in a designated room in Duke’s student union. All students who completed the
survey were paid $20. Our sample consists of 173 students who completed our survey.9
In addition to data on career and income expectations, we collected data on students’ back-
ground characteristics and their current or intended major. Table 1 presents a summary of the
characteristics of our sample and compares them with the corresponding characteristics of the
male undergraduate population at Duke. Due to the large number of majors oﬀered at Duke
University, we divided the majors into six broad groups: natural science, humanities, engineer-
ing, social sciences, economics, and policy. The classiﬁcation system of the majors is reported
in Table 2.10 Those who had already declared their majors were asked to provide us with their
current major; those who have not declared were asked to provide us with their intended major.
While our sampling strategy was not systematically random, one can see from Table 1 that our
sample corresponds fairly closely to the Duke male undergraduate student body. Our sample
includes slightly more Asians and fewer Latinos and Blacks than is at Duke. It also appears
that a higher percentage of our sample receives some ﬁnancial aid than is the case in the Duke
student body, although the 22.0% ﬁgure for the student body is based on aid provided by Duke,
whereas the higher percentage of students receiving ﬁnancial aid (40.5%) is likely due to the fact
that our survey asked about receipt of ﬁnancial aid, regardless of source.
3.1 Expectations about Future Careers
In our survey, we elicited students’ expectations about future careers and how much they ex-
pected to earn in them. We asked each student the probability that they would choose a
particular career and the income they would expect to receive if they were in that career, con-
ditional on their having majored in each of the majors listed in Table 2. We used the following
six broad career groups to characterize possible careers: science/technology, health, business,
government/non-proﬁt, education and law. These groups were based on the distribution of the
careers that the Duke undergraduates have historically entered after they graduated. Sample
means, taken over the full sample, for expected income 10 years after graduation and probabil-
ities associated with the alternative careers, conditional on a student majoring in each possible
ﬁeld, are presented in Table 3.11
There are several interesting patterns in Table 3 with respect to the expectations elicited
about careers from our sample of undergraduates. First, there are marked diﬀerences in the
9The questionnaire we used in our survey is discussed further in Kang (2009) and a copy of it can be found at
www.econ.duke.edu/∼vjh3/working papers/college major questionnaire.pdf.
10There are four diﬀerent schools at Duke in which undergraduates are enrolled: Trinity College (college of arts
and sciences), Pratt School of Engineering, Nicholas School of the Environment, and Sanford School of Public
Policy.
11For those respondents whose probabilities for each choice did not add up to 1 or 100, their stated probabilities
were proportionally adjusted so that the sum of the probabilities associated with the career choices is 1.







Social Science 17.9% 18.8%
Economics 19.7% 18.0%














U.S. Citizen 94.8% 94.1%
Receives Financial Aid§ 40.5% 22.0%
Sample Size 173
† The information on the Duke male population is drawn from a recent
student survey done by the Campus Life and Learning (CLL) Project
at Duke University. See Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Fang and Spenner (2009)
for a detailed description of the CLL dataset.
‡ Respondents were asked to choose one of the six choices (science,
humanities, engineering, social science, economics, policy) in response
to the questions: “What is your current ﬁeld of study? If you have not
declared your major, what is your intended ﬁeld of study?”
§ For the Duke male study body, the proportion receiving ﬁnancial aid
includes those who received need-based, merit or athletic aid in school
year 2008-2009. Source: Duke Undergraduate Financial Aid Oﬃce.
6Table 2: Major Groups and Actual Majors Oﬀered at Duke University
Science Engineering
Biological Anthropology and Anatomy Computer Science
Biology Biomedical Engineering
Chemistry Civil Engineering




Art History Cultural Anthropology
Asian and African Languages and Literature History
Classical Civilization/Classical Languages Linguistics
Dance Psychology
English Sociology
French Studies Women’s Studies
German
International Comparative Studies Economics
Italian Studies Economics
Literature
Medieval & Renaissance Studies Policy
Music Environmental Science and Policy
Philosophy Political Science




probabilities of entering the six careers across the various majors. Some careers appear to be
tied to certain majors, whereas other careers are less so. For example, if students were to major
in the (natural) Sciences or Engineering, the probability of going into Science or Health related
careers is fairly high, compared to if the students were to major in one of the other ﬁelds. A
similar pattern occurs for entering a career in the ﬁeld of Education, which is more likely if a
student were to major in the Humanities compared to other majors. In contrast, the probabilities
of going into a Business career are relatively high for all majors. This is especially true for being
an economics major, where students indicate that the probability of going to a Business career
is .515, which is substantially higher than the career probabilities found for any of the other
majors. The “link” between career and majors for the other careers falls somewhere between
these two extremes. Second, student expectations about the earnings in careers 10 years out
did not vary much across the major ﬁelds we asked them to condition their responses on. Put
diﬀerently, students in our sample appear to view future earnings to be primarily determined by
what career one enters, with little role for the major ﬁeld in which one might have studied.
The sample means presented in Table 3 are calculated over all students in the sample, re-
gardless of whether they are majoring (or intending to major) in a particular ﬁeld and of what
class they are in. It is of interest to consider how the expectations elicited diﬀered by a student’s
7Table 3: Elicited Expected Incomes (10 years out) and Elicited Probabilities of
Going into Various Careers and Majors
If Career in:
If Majored in: Science Health Business Govt. Education Law
A. Probability of Going into Career†
Science 0.352 0.319 0.120 0.070 0.068 0.070
Humanities 0.067 0.122 0.235 0.145 0.230 0.200
Engineering 0.411 0.194 0.190 0.072 0.065 0.068
Social Sciences 0.091 0.139 0.246 0.193 0.128 0.204
Economics 0.067 0.076 0.515 0.154 0.062 0.125
Policy 0.054 0.113 0.228 0.317 0.075 0.214
B. Expected Income 10 Years Out‡
Science 106,156 162,000 138,121 93,965 72,590 143,694
Humanities 77,994 122,769 130,618 90,971 70,936 147,087
Engineering 118,012 152,462 153,318 97,017 74,746 165,422
Social Sciences 81,942 122,393 142,676 95,532 71,000 149,965
Economics 91,023 126,769 192,306 101,957 78,283 158,254
Policy 86,052 123,382 156,705 103,653 71,925 164,809
† To elicit career probabilities, students were asked: “Suppose you majored in each of the following
academic ﬁelds [Sciences, Humanities, Engineering, Social Sciences, Economics, Public Policy].
What are the probabilities that you will pursue the following career ﬁeld [science, health, business,
government/non-proﬁt, education, law] AFTER majoring in this academic ﬁeld.”
‡ To elicit expected earnings associated with diﬀerent careers and majors, students were asked:
“For the following questions regarding future income, please answer them in pre-tax, per-year,
U.S. dollar term, ignoring the inﬂation eﬀect. Suppose you majored in the following academic
ﬁeld. How much do you think you will make working in the following career 10 years after
graduation?”
class/year at Duke and by whether the student was majoring in a particular major or not. With
respect to both dimensions, we might expect diﬀerences, by one’s major and class/year, in the
information students have about diﬀerent careers. For example, underclassmen might have less
information about careers than do upperclassmen, since the latter group is closer to graduation
and, thus, may be devoting more time to learn about their future prospects. Similarly, students
who were majoring in a particular ﬁeld may have a better idea about the earnings potential of
careers more closely related to their ﬁeld of study than would be the case for non-majors. It also
may be the case that students who major in a ﬁeld expect that they have an major-speciﬁc abso-
lute advantage in certain careers, because of their major-speciﬁc abilities. In Table 4, we present
the diﬀerences in the means for expected earnings (10 years out) for the various career-major
combinations between students who majored in the particular career versus those who did not
(non-majors) and between upper- and under-classmen. We also display in this table results for
hypothesis tests of diﬀerences between these groups in student earnings expectations.
While there is no clear pattern to diﬀerences in majors vs. non-majors and upper- vs. under-
classmen for most of the various careers and major ﬁelds, there are a couple of notable exceptions
in Table 4. First, students who are currently majoring in Policy have markedly higher income
expectations than students majoring in other ﬁelds for all careers but those in Health. Further-
more, several of these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. For example, Policy majors expect
8Table 4: Diﬀerences by Own Major vs. Non-Major and Upper- vs. Under-Classmen in
Elicited Expected Incomes (10 years out) for Alternative Careers and Majors†
If Career in:
Major Science Health Business Govt. Education Law
A. In Major vs. Non-Major
Science -2,391 54,745** 48,663*** 14,426 -2,565 20,652
Humanities -9,153 1,977 -2,059 2,993 -68 -6,087
Engineering -19,074 -24,200 -14,922 -20,467 -7,175 -39,465
Social Sciences 267 -1,736 -234 1,592 -9,511 -13,949
Economics -12,438 -2,567 -5,433 -10,672 -13,421 3,271
Policy 36,455*** -1,265 16,501 27,813 36,053*** 84,171***
B. Upper-Classmen vs. Under-Classmen
Science -20,733* -13,473 12,461 -10,140 -13,835* 5,452
Humanities -14,223 -3,235 -2,295 -8,219 -18,621* 649
Engineering -10,921 -267 26,076* -10,696 -12,376 50,857
Social Sciences -12,257 -2,630 4,850 -9,728 -15,050** -9,471
Economics -3,520 5,771 6,205 -21,227 -9,863 9,437
Policy -12,716 -786 -15,956 -16,402 -14,747* 4,311
† Test results for between-group diﬀerences in means of expected income: * signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 10%; **
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 5%; *** signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 1%.
to earn more than 50% higher salaries ($84,171) if they enter the ﬁeld of Law than if non-majors
were to enter the same ﬁeld having majored in Policy. Second, we ﬁnd that upperclassmen,
regardless of their major, expect to earn less if they enter either a Science or Education careers
than do underclassmen, with diﬀerences for Education careers being statistically signiﬁcant. The
two patterns just cited may be due to systematic diﬀerences in the tastes and/or abilities of Policy
majors or in upper- versus underclassmen with respect to Education careers. But, a potentially
more plausible explanation is that there are diﬀerences in information between groups – e.g.,
upper-classmen may have more information than underclassmen about the low earnings of ca-
reers in Education careers based on the former group’s greater preparations for life-after-college
– and these diﬀerences lead to systematically diﬀerent forecasts. Below, we present some results
concerning students’ expected earnings for the average Duke student that are quite consistent
with the diﬀerences-in-forecasts explanation.
We use the earnings expectations and career probabilities that we elicited for the alternative
career-major combinations to form major-speciﬁc expected earnings by computing the weighted
averages of the career-major expected earnings, using the career probabilities associated with
each speciﬁc major as weights. Sample means for these major-speciﬁc expected earnings, 10
years out, are given in Table 5. Unlike the sample means presented in Table 3, the sample
means in Table 5 are for students who are majoring in or intend to major in each of the major
ﬁelds. According to the theoretical model of college major choice outlined in Section 2, we would
expect to ﬁnd that students are more likely to major in ﬁelds in which they have a comparative
expected earnings advantage. Looking along the diagonals in Panel A of Table 5, we do see
evidence of income sorting in choice of majors. For all but those whose “own major” is in the
ﬁeld of Humanities, students expect that the earnings in their own major is the highest, or
second highest, compared to all of the other majors. This pattern is seen in Panel B of Table 5,
9Table 5: Elicited Expected Incomes (10 Years Out), Conditional on Pursuing Alternative
Majors by Own Major†
If Majored in:
Own Major Science Humanities Engineering Soc. Sci. Economics Policy
A. Expected Annual Income, 10 Years Out
Science 169,385 138,856 157,489 148,483 197,043 154,981
Humanities 120,158 115,786 119,484 129,314 135,255 112,377
Engineering 111,982 97,326 122,416 102,250 148,880 100,569
Social Sciences 121,610 101,150 120,308 125,578 144,877 117,820
Economics 130,839 112,475 133,916 119,021 160,488 125,676
Policy 152,761 139,314 162,677 149,457 187,109 180,350
B. Prop. of Students Where Expected Inc is at Least as High in Own Major
Science 0.419 0.097 0.226 0.194 0.581 0.129
Humanities 0.063 0.188 0.188 0.063 0.500 0.000
Engineering 0.242 0.152 0.242 0.091 0.545 0.061
Social Sciences 0.097 0.032 0.419 0.161 0.645 0.226
Economics 0.147 0.147 0.206 0.118 0.647 0.147
Policy 0.357 0.143 0.321 0.214 0.571 0.214
† There is one observation for every student in every cell. Here we do not condition on student’s own major.
See text for how expected incomes were calculated using information elicited from students.
which records the proportion of students who indicate that the expected earnings in their own
major is the highest, or at least as high, compared to the majors they did not choose.12
At the same time, we also ﬁnd that the majority of students would expect that they would
have their highest, or at least as high of, earnings if they majored in Economics, regardless of their
actual major. Looking back at the career probabilities and expected incomes for diﬀerent career-
major combinations in Table 3, it is clear that this ﬁnding is driven by the combination of the high
expected incomes that all students associate with Business careers and, more importantly, the
fact that students think majoring in Economics is much more likely to lead to a career in Business
(probability = .515) relative to all other majors. As a result, the majority of students expect
to have an absolute income advantage to majoring in Economics, even though only slightly less
than 20% of Duke male undergraduates have chosen to do so. Thus, while we do ﬁnd evidence
in our data of income sorting in the choice of college majors, it appears that there are other
factors that inﬂuence students decisions. We consider one of them, a student’s abilities in various
majors, in the next section.
3.2 Assessments of Abilities in Alternative Majors
In our survey, we also elicited measures of students’ perceived abilities for each of the major
ﬁelds. In particular, we asked each student to rate their competitiveness relative to their peers
at Duke in each of the six majors. All else equal, we would expect students to sort to the
major in which they have a comparative ability advantage. In Table 6 we see clear evidence of
12Some students gave the same expected earnings for two or more majors. As a result, 17.3% of the students
had two or more majors with the highest expected earning.
10Table 6: Elicited Rankings of Student’s Ability if he Pursued Alternative Majors by Own
Major†
If Majored in:
Own Major Science Humanities Engineering Soc. Sci. Economics Policy
A. Ability Ratings
Science 4.000 3.548 2.710 3.548 2.871 2.774
Humanities 2.625 4.438 1.750 3.750 2.500 3.375
Engineering 3.576 3.000 3.909 3.182 3.242 2.818
Social Sciences 2.806 3.419 2.129 4.000 2.677 2.935
Economics 3.412 3.176 2.353 3.412 3.794 3.206
Policy 2.536 3.536 1.821 3.786 2.893 4.286
All Majors 3.225 3.428 2.532 3.590 3.058 3.197
B. Prop. of Students for Whom Highest Ability Rating would be in this Major
Science 0.774 0.387 0.194 0.484 0.194 0.226
Humanities 0.125 0.938 0.063 0.375 0.125 0.313
Engineering 0.424 0.242 0.697 0.242 0.333 0.121
Social Science 0.161 0.290 0.129 0.677 0.194 0.194
Economics 0.324 0.235 0.206 0.324 0.588 0.235
Public Policy 0.179 0.321 0.071 0.500 0.107 0.821
† Students were asked: “Rate your competitiveness relative to your peers at Duke in academic ﬁeld j”, using a
5-point scale with 1 = much worse, 3 = average, 5 = much better.
such advantage. Looking along the diagonals of either Panel A, which gives the average student
ability ratings in their own major, or of Panel B, which gives the proportion of students that had
the highest ability rating in their own major, one sees strong evidence of sorting by ability in
choice of major ﬁelds. Furthermore, ability sorting in choice of a major appears to be stronger
than sorting on expected future earnings. In particular, note that the proportion of students
with their highest ability rating in their own major (the diagonal elements of Panel B) are much
higher than the proportion of students that have their highest expected earnings in their own
major (the diagonal elements of Panel B in Table 5).
Finally, the ability ratings of students also appear consistent with one’s sense of the diﬃculty
of the curriculums across majors. Looking at the average ratings taken over all majors for each
of the major ﬁelds, we ﬁnd that the average student ﬁnds Engineering the most challenging ﬁeld
(2.532), followed by Economics (3.058) and the average student ﬁnds that Social Science (3.590)
and Humanities (3.428) are the least diﬃcult majors.
3.3 Expectations for the “Average” Duke Student
Students can diﬀer in their forecasts of future expected earnings in diﬀerent careers and majors
precisely because they diﬀer in their abilities to succeed in diﬀerent majors and, subsequently,
in various careers. But, as noted in the Introduction, students’ expectations about the future
also can diﬀer because they make forecast errors. Without waiting for ten years to ﬁnd out their
actual earnings (and career choices), we cannot get direct measures of such errors and examine
11Table 7: Elicited Expected Incomes (10 years out) for Average Duke Student in
Alternative Majors and Careers by Student’s Own Major
If in Career:
If Majored in: Science Health Business Govt. Education Law
Science 110,607 166,988 124,133 77,815 71,873 109,994
Humanities 74,578 116,965 128,410 89,618 77,983 139,566
Engineering 120,925 153,295 141,162 80,168 68,919 135,786
Social Sciences 80,283 112,809 133,110 88,618 74,618 136,191
Economics 79,509 107,335 176,566 91,988 69,440 137,509
Policy 74,145 106,948 134,301 99,295 71,162 143,173
their properties. But we can determine the relative properties of students’ forecasts by asking
all students to make forecasts about the future for a similar event or person. In our survey,
we asked each student to provide us with their assessments of what the “average” Duke [male]
undergraduate would earn in diﬀerent career-major combinations to parallel the questions we
asked of students about their expectations about their own future earnings. In particular, we
asked:
Suppose an average Duke student majored in [Sciences, Humanities, Engineering,
Social Sciences, Economics, Public Policy]. How much do you think he will make
working in the following careers [Science, Health, Business, Government, Education,
Law] 10 years after graduation?
Let Y AV
ijk10 denote student i’s answer to how much the average Duke student would earn in
career k conditional on majoring in ﬁeld j 10 years after graduation. To see how expected
earnings for the average student varies at the major-career level, we report the sample averages







Table 7. In general, the expected earnings for the average Duke student for the diﬀerent career-
major combinations are similar to the corresponding student expectations about their own future
earnings in Table 3. However, there are diﬀerences between the two sets of forecasts.
To provide a sense about the extent to which students’ earnings expectations are subject to
forecast errors, we compared the expected earnings for the average Duke student between majors
and non-majors and between upper- and under-classmen. The results of these comparisons are
reported in Table 8. The structure of Table 8 parallels Table 4. While most of the diﬀerences in
means between majors and non-majors and upper- and under-classmen are not that sizeable or
statistically diﬀerent at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, there are some notable exceptions. In
particular, Policy majors consistently have higher forecasts of expected earnings for the average
Duke student compared to students who are not Policy majors. Furthermore, upper-classmen
consistently have lower forecasts of the expected earnings that the average Duke student would
have in Education careers than do under-classmen. Recall that we found in Table 4 diﬀerences in
the same direction for the corresponding comparisons of students’ expectations about what their
own earnings would be and that these diﬀerences in that Table also were statistically signiﬁcant.
Taken together these ﬁndings strongly suggest that expectations about future earnings are,
indeed, subject to forecast errors and that such errors are likely to inﬂuence students’ choice
of majors in non-trivial ways. We explicitly examine this inﬂuence in section 6, where we use
12Table 8: Diﬀerences in Elicited Expected Incomes (10 years out) for Average Duke Student
by Own Major vs. Non-Major and Upper- vs. Under-Classmen†
Career
Major Science Health Business Govt. Education Law
A. In Major vs. Non-Major
Sciences 9,675 42,380 13,436 -16,006 -13,286 204
Humanities -1,257 -18,350 -1,003 -2,334 -3,355 3,232
Engineering -22,487 -30,096 -13,418 -6,573 -1,098 -27,932
Soc. Sci. -9,227 -13,169 -26,465 -13,723 -21,072** -26,760*
Economics 3,540 3,683 17,269 4,297 3,955 17,743
Policy 44,271*** 35,173** 13,831 33,396*** 38,029*** 56,082***
B. Upper-Classmen vs. Under-Classmen
Sciences -21,426* 19,760 6,771 -11,947 -17,750* 1,209
Humanities -14,499 9,855 4,232 -17,632* -32,279*** -19
Engineering -15,703 18,488 24,521* -7,838 -15,975* 46,745
Soc. Sci. -8,573 11,167 12,847 -22,266** -14,932* 5,364
Economics 1,364 13,659 24,969 -13,302 -21,948** 4,040
Policy -9,573 11,545 -4,435 -9,127 -21,297** -2,095
† Test results for between-group diﬀerences in means of expected income: * signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 10%;
** signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 5%; *** signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 1%.
students’ expectations for the earnings of the average Duke student to eliminate such forecast
errors from students’ own expected earnings and examine how students’ choice of majors would
change in the absence of such errors.
4 Empirical Model of College Major Choice
In this section, we lay out an empirical model of college major choice in order to examine the
interplay of students’ ability, expected income and preferences over majors and careers. As noted
in Section 2, we based our data collection on a model of how students made their college major
decisions. We now provide an explicit characterization of that model, as well as a speciﬁcation
of the process generating students’ expected future earnings associated with alternative careers
and majors that require expectations data on earnings for only one point in students’ futures.
As noted in Section 2, we assume that a student’s choice of major is a one-shot decision,
i.e., we do not allow students to change their majors. Furthermore, to simplify our analysis, we
assume that once students have made their major decisions, they do not choose their careers
upon graduation, but rather face a lottery over alternative careers, where the probabilities of
being assigned to particular careers depend upon their choice of major. Following the notation
in Section 2, let Pijk denote the probability of i being assigned career k conditional on choosing
major j. Once he realizes his draw on a career, the student makes no further decision and reaps
the “beneﬁts” of his choice of major and the outcome of his career assignment. These beneﬁts
come in the form of the consumption he can realize in each remaining period of his lifetime and,
as we describe below, preferences over careers.
134.1 Earnings and Consumption
We now lay out a set of assumptions that allow us to express a student’s expected future streams
of utility from consumption associated with alternative major-career pairs as a parsimonious
function of the expected earnings for these pairs that we elicited in our data. Let Yijkt denote
the earnings for individual i, with major j and career k, in future period t, where Yijkt is the
following function of the individual’s permanent premium for the major-career combination,
µijk, a growth rate which is major-speciﬁc but neither career or individual-speciﬁc, gjt,13 and a
mean-zero transitory error term, ijkt:
Yijkt = exp(µijk + gjt + ijkt) (2)
Individuals are assumed not to know ijkt until after they choose their major, so that they only
have expectations of the future ’s at the time they are making this decision.
We assume that the individual’s utility in period t is proportional to the log of his con-
sumption in that period, lnCijkt, and that there is no savings so that individuals consume their
earnings in each period, i.e., Cijkt = Yijkt.14 Normalizing the price of consumption to one,
the expected present discounted value of the utility associated with consumption if individual i
majors in major j, vC













βtPijk (µijk + gjt) (3)
where β is the rate of time preference and α is the (utility) value of log consumption.
It follows from (2) that a student’s beliefs about the earnings associated with diﬀerent major-
career combinations 10 years after graduating from college, ˆ Yijk10, is given by:
ˆ Yijk10 = E[exp(µijk + gj10 + ijk10)] (4)
We assume that the ’s have the same moments across i and k, conditional on major j. It follows
that E[exp(ijk10)] = E[exp(ijk010)] for all k, k0, so that we can express vC
ij as a function of ˆ Yijk10





Pijk ln ˆ Yijk10 + φ∗
j (5)
where α∗ and φ∗









βt (gjt − gj10 − ln(E[exp(ijK10)])) (7)
13Below we will show that the model generalizes to cases where the growth rate on earnings is additive in career
and major: gjkt = gjt + gkt.
14An alternative assumption that yields the same reduced form is that individuals are able to perfectly con-
sumption smooth. In this case, we also can have probabilities of employment that diﬀer by major. See Arcidiacono
(2005) for a discussion.
14where, since E[exp(ijk10)] = E[exp(ijk010)], we have expressed the last line relative to career
K. Using the individual’s subjective expectations of expected income by career and major, if






Pijk ln ˆ Yijk10 + φ∗
j (8)
In all of the empirical models of college choice that we estimate, the payoﬀ associated with
major j, vij, depends on expected future consumption via vC
ij in (8). Our initial models assume
that major payoﬀs are equal to vC
ij plus an individual- and major-speciﬁc preference component,





Pijk ln ˆ Yijk10 + ηij (9)
4.2 Utility while in College
Assuming that the payoﬀs from diﬀerent majors depend only on expected lifetime consumption
ignores the role that the coursework in a major may have on the choice of a major. Individuals
may be selecting majors not because of the pay but because of the diﬀerences in the diﬃculty
of coursework across majors and their abilities to do the coursework. These abilities to do the
coursework then translate into higher expected earnings. To get at the role of diﬃculty of majors
and students’ abilities to complete them, we control for students’ assessments of their relative
abilities in the each of the majors, Aij, that we elicited in our survey. In particular, we model
the observed utility of the major choice while in school as uij = γj + Aijθ, so that vij becomes:
vij = γ∗
j + Aijθ + α∗
K X
k=1
Pijk ln ˆ Yijk10 + ηij (10)
where γ∗
j = γj + Aijθ.
4.3 Career Preferences
Finally, we allow for diﬀerences in preferences over careers themselves in some of our speciﬁcations
of our college choice model. Normalizing the preferences for the ﬁrst K-1 careers relative to career
K yields the following payoﬀ to student i for major j:
vij = γ∗
j + Aijθ + α∗
K X
k=1




k + ηij (11)
We note that the career-speciﬁc preferences also may be picking up diﬀerences in growth rates
across majors. In particular, if we assume that major-career speciﬁc growth rates in earnings
can be written as gjk = gj + gk, then δ∗
k can be decomposed into the actual preference for the
career, δk, plus a function of the diﬀerence in growth rates between career k and career K:
δ∗
k = δk +
T X
t=1
βt (gkt − gk10 − gKt + gk10)
154.4 Estimation
Assuming that students choose their college major so as to maximize their expected utility, let
dij = 1 when j = argmaxj0 vij0 and zero otherwise. To simplify the estimation, we assume
that the unobserved preferences for particular majors, the ηij’s, follow a Type I extreme value







Given data on the choices of a major (or intended choice) by the students in our sample, the log






1[dij = 1]log[pij] (13)
where 1[ ] is the indicator function.
Similar to Zafar (2008), we also elicited more information from the students in our sample
than just their choice (or expected choice) of major. In particular, we asked them to provide
their full preference orderings over all of the majors. The details of the survey responses to this
question are given in the Appendix. These data can be used to estimate the parameters of the
alternative speciﬁcations of the payoﬀ functions, vij, in (9), (10) and (11) via a rank-ordered,
or exploded, logit model. Let ri = (ri1,ri2,...,rim,...,riJ)0, where rim denotes the major that
student i ranked as the mth highest of the J majors. Then it follows that the probability of
observing student i’s rankings of majors, ri, is given by:













Table 9 presents estimates for the three alternative speciﬁcations of a multinomial logit model
of students’ college major choices corresponding to the major-speciﬁc payoﬀ functions in (9),
(10) and (11), respectively. For all three speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on expected
log earnings ten years out, ˆ Yijk10, is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Consistent
with Arcidiacono (2004), we also ﬁnd that students’ comparative advantage in their abilities in
diﬀerent majors plays a very important role in choice of a major, over and above the earnings
they expect to receive from diﬀerent majors. For example, moving from a four to a ﬁve on the
self-assessed ability scale is equivalent to an 86% increase in earnings. Finally, we ﬁnd much
less evidence that preferences for speciﬁc careers inﬂuence students’ choice of a major. The one
exception to this is the eﬀect of a career in the government, which is statistically signiﬁcant and
very negative in the multinomial logit estimates.
16Table 9: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Major Choice†
Coeﬀ. St. Error Coeﬀ. St. Error Coeﬀ. St. Error
Natural Science 0.060 (0.264) 0.066 (0.304) -0.436 (0.408)
Humanities -0.364 (0.319) -0.694 (0.351) -1.299 (0.417)
Engineering 0.082 (0.261) 0.540 (0.316) 0.112 (0.422)
Social Science 0.182 (0.265) -0.118 (0.294) -0.421 (0.315)
Economics -0.105 (0.268) 0.167 (0.299) 0.053 (0.356)
Expected Ln Earnings 1.612 (0.389) 1.690 (0.466) 1.463 (0.514)
Aij = 3 1.110 (0.360) 1.162 (0.369)
Aij = 4 2.130 (0.352) 2.102 (0.361)
Aij = 5 3.538 (0.376) 3.592 (0.388)
Science Career -1.146 (0.847)
Health Career -0.511 (0.835)
Business Career -1.176 (0.799)
Govt. Career -4.225 (1.244)
Education Career 0.069 (1.284)
Log Likelihood 296.1 223.8 216.4
† N = 173. The omitted major category is public policy. The omitted career category is law.
As noted in Section 4.4, we also estimated an exploded logit model for the same speciﬁcations
used in the multinomial logit model, using the data on the preference orderings over majors
elicited from students. Results for alternative speciﬁcations of the latter model are presented in
Table 14 of the Appendix. Many of the estimates for the exploded logit models are qualitative
similar to those for the multinomial logit models in Table 9. For example, the coeﬃcients
on expected log earnings and on the ability measures have the same signs and patterns of
statistical signiﬁcance as those found in Table 9. At the same time, the magnitudes of the
coeﬃcient estimates on log earnings and the ability measures in the exploded logit models are
substantially smaller in magnitude than those for the multinomial logit models. Furthermore, the
eﬀect of careers in government in the exploded logit model is no longer negative or statistically
signiﬁcant. These diﬀerences in estimates between the two models may result from the violations
of the assumption made in both models that the errors in the payoﬀs to alternative majors are
independent.
Using the multinomial logit estimates from the last column of Table 9, we examine the eﬀect
of expected log earnings and abilities on major choice. These results are presented in Table 10.
The ﬁrst column of this Table displays the baseline probability of choosing each of the majors.
In the second and third columns, we use the parameter estimates to forecast choice behavior
when abilities and earnings, respectively, are the same across majors. When abilities are set
equal, large shifts occur as individuals move away from the Humanities and the Social Sciences
and into Engineering, with some movement also into the Economics major. This occurs in part
because earnings now plays a greater role in sorting and, in part, because students’ beliefs about
their ability to do well in Engineering are much lower than their beliefs about their abilities
to perform in other majors. In contrast, when earnings are set equal, the share of individuals
choosing Humanities and Social Science majors increases by 17% and 10%, respectively, with
the share choosing Economics as a major falling by 16%. The overall distribution across majors
when earnings are equal, however, still leaves no major drawing more than 20% of the students.
17Table 10: The Eﬀect of Expected Earnings and Abilities on Major Choice†
1 Std. Dev. 1 Std. Dev. 1 Std. Dev.
Equal Equal Increase Increase Increase
Baseline Abilities Earnings Science Career Business Career Major
Natural Science 17.9% 16.6% 17.8% 18.9% 16.2% 25.9%
Humanities 9.3% 5.9% 10.9% 8.6% 9.1% 15.0%
Engineering 19.1% 27.1% 19.0% 21.1% 18.6% 26.6%
Social Science 17.9% 12.2% 19.7% 17.4% 17.2% 26.8%
Economics 19.7% 23.8% 16.6% 18.6% 22.9% 29.3%
Public Policy 16.2% 14.4% 16.0% 15.4% 16.1% 23.2%
† Forecasts used the multinomial logit estimates from the last column in Table 9. The last three columns refer to one
standard deviation increases. The last column shows major choices when earnings for that major were increased holding
earnings in the other majors constant.
The fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 10 show the eﬀects of one standard deviation increases
in the earnings of Science and Business careers, respectively. These standard deviation increases
are calculated conditional on a major. Increasing earnings in Science careers results in shifts
from all the other majors to Natural Science and Engineering majors. The share of individuals
choosing Natural Science and Engineering majors increases by 5.5% and 10%, respectively, from
a one standard deviation increase in earnings from Science careers. In contrast, a one standard
deviation increase in the earnings from Business careers leads to drops of 9.5% and 3% in the share
of Natural Science and Engineering majors. This is coupled with a 16% increase in Economics
majors. The last column of Table 10 shows the eﬀects of a one standard deviation increase in
expected earnings for a major as a whole, holding earnings in the other majors constant. Here
the results are quite large. All majors see at least a 40% increase in the share choosing the
particular major with Humanities majors increasing by over 60%.
In Table 11, we present estimates for the alternative models separately for students who are
under-classmen (i.e., freshmen and sophomores) and those who are upper-classmen (i.e., juniors
and seniors). The corresponding exploded logit model estimates are presented in Table 15 of the
Appendix. The pattern of the coeﬃcients is quite similar across the two groups of students. In
both the multinomial logit and exploded logit estimates, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that
under-classmen prefer Education careers relatively more than do upper-classmen. (Recall this
pattern was found in Table 4 for the unadjusted diﬀerences between classes in expected earnings
for diﬀerent careers and majors.) Note that the coeﬃcients on expected log earnings are not
only statistically signiﬁcant for both under- and upper-classmen but they also are virtually
identical in magnitude. In his study of the choice of college majors by students at Northwestern
University, Zafar (2008) only interviewed sophomores because of a concern that asking upper-
classmen about their choice of a major would raise issues of “cognitive dissonance,” given that
upper-classmen, compared to under-classmen, might be more inclined to tilt their responses
about expected outcomes in favor of the majors they had chosen. Our estimates suggest that
Zafar’s concern does not seem to apply to the expected future earnings associated with chosen



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































196 Forecast Errors and Choice of Major
As noted in Section 3.3, students diﬀer in their forecasts not only because they diﬀer in their
abilities to succeed in diﬀerent majors and careers, but also because they make errors in these
forecasts. We provided some initial evidence for such errors, using data students provided about
their forecasts of earnings for common person, namely the average Duke student. In what follows,
we use the latter data, along with the model estimates presented above to address the following
hypothetical question: How would the choice of college majors change, if at all, if student
forecasts about future earnings in various majors and careers were not subject to idiosyncratic
forecast errors? In what follows, we outline our strategy for purging students’ forecasts of such
errors and then present results on the extent to which such forecast errors may aﬀect the college
major choices of students.
6.1 Adjusting Expected Earnings for Student Forecast Errors
To characterize students’ forecast errors for their future earnings associated with the alternative
majors and careers, we proceed as follows. Let each student’s earnings premium for career k and
major j in period t, µijkt, be written as
µijkt = µjkt + ζijkt + λijk (16)
where µjkt is the average premium in the (student) population for the various major-career
combinations, ζijkt is student i’s corresponding forecast error relative to this population average
premium and λijk denotes the student’s comparative advantage in earnings for the particular
major-career combination. We also assume that ζijkt has a median of zero. Finally, we assume
that student responses to what they would expect the earnings of the average Duke student to
be as of t = 10 for each major-career combination, Y AV
ijk10, measures the sum of µjkt and ζijkt as
follows:
Y AV
ijk10 = exp(µjk10 + ζijk10) (17)
It follows that an estimate of µjk10 is given by the sample median of the students’ log expectations
of the average Duke student’s earnings:15
µjk10 = lnY MD
jk10 ≡ median(lnY AV
ijk10) (18)
Then it follows that we can purge students’ expectations about their own earnings in diﬀerent
majors and careers of their forecast errors, ζijk10, as follows:
Y ∗
ijk10 =






ijk10 denotes student i’s adjusted earnings for major j and career k as of t = 10.
15We allow the estimates of µjk10 to vary by whether the individual is an upperclassmen or not due to the
timing of the survey being during the ﬁnancial crisis and this possibly aﬀecting cohorts diﬀerently. However, the
estimates of switching behavior are similar when we restrict the premiums to be the same across the two groups.
206.2 Choices without Forecast Errors
We use the estimation results presented in Table 9 to examine how the students’ choice of majors
would have changed if their forecasts of the premiums for diﬀerent major-career combinations
had been purged of forecast errors, using the strategy outlined in the preceding section. To do
this, we return to the model, focusing in particular on the case where we control for major-speciﬁc
abilities and career preferences. In this case, student i chooses major j1 when:
j1 = argmax
j
γj + Aijθ + α∗
K X
k=1
Pijk ln ˆ Yijk10 +
K−1 X
k=1
Pijkδk + ηij (20)
We can use this decision rule to generate η’s consistent with their choice behavior. Once we
have this set of η’s we can then see how often decisions would change if we purged expected log
earnings of measurement error. We ﬁrst draw one hundred sets of η’s for each individual such
that their choice of major is consistent with the decision rule in (20). Consider an individual
who chooses j1. This individual would have chosen a diﬀerent major when the combination of
how expected earnings changed due to removing forecast error and the draw on the η’s is such
that it is no longer optimal to choose major j1:
j1 6= argmax
j








We average over the implied switching behavior across individuals and draws on the η’s for
their initial choice. Average switching behavior is reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 12. The
average probability of switching due to the removal of the forecast error was a little over seven
and a half percent. At a little over four percent, switch rates were signiﬁcantly lower for the
40% of the sample who ranked themselves at the top of the self assessment scale in their major
(Aij = 5). For those who did not self report their ability as the highest category for their major,
switch rates were much higher at ten percent. This latter group is more likely to be on the
margin of switching majors and also may have chosen majors on the basis of bad information
regarding their labor market prospects. We distinguish between these possibilities next.
To investigate how forecast errors may be aﬀecting college major decisions we calculate the
fraction of positive forecast errors both in and out of one’s own major. The overall rate is
above ﬁfty percent. Since at the major-career level the rate would be at exactly ﬁfty percent,
this suggests forecast error is aﬀecting the probabilities individuals will end up in particular
careers. Namely, if individuals erroneously believe premiums are high in a particular career,
they associate higher probabilities of being in the career. This suggests, in contrast to what we
have estimated, that choice of career is endogenous even after controlling for major.16
The third and fourth rows of Table 12 suggest that individuals are more likely to have upward-
biased estimates of earnings in their own major. This makes sense in a model where individuals
are making their major decisions based upon signals of market rewards for particular major-
career combinations. The forecast errors are actually smaller for those who report lower abilities
in their major. Hence, the higher switching behavior observed for those with lower within-major
ability occurs because these individuals are at the margin of switching, not because of higher
16In future work, we hope to model this endogeneity explicitly.
21Table 12: Forecast Errors and Switching Behavior†
Overall Aij = 5 in major Aij < 5 in major
Share switching if forecast error was removed 7.77% 4.32% 10.06%
Fraction of positive forecast errors 53.3% 54.1% 52.7%
Fraction of positive forecast errors in major 55.5% 58.0% 53.9%
Fraction of positive forecast error out of major 52.8% 53.3% 52.5%
† Forecasts used the multinomial logit estimates from the last column in Table 9. See text for details of the con-
struction of the forecast errors.
forecast errors. In fact, the lower forecast errors for this group suggests that these individuals,
because they were at the margin, invested more time in ﬁnding out the true market premiums
when making their decisions.
7 Conclusion
The choice of college major plays a critical role in determining the future earnings of college
graduates. Economic models of educational choices suggest that students’ college major decisions
would be guided, in part, by the future earnings streams associated with the diﬀerent majors.
To examine the potential role of future expected earnings on these choices, we asked a sample
of college students about their subjective expectations on the probabilities of entering diﬀerent
careers and the earnings associated with diﬀerent careers conditional on both their own major,
as well as conditional on majors they did not choose, their counterfactual expectations.
The descriptive statistics and model estimates reveal that sorting occurs, both on expected
earnings and on individual perceptions of their relative abilities to perform the coursework in
particular majors. Our estimates imply that equalizing abilities would lead to a substantial
increase in the number of students majoring in Economics and a drop in the number majoring
in Humanities. In contrast, if we equalize expected earnings across majors, our estimates imply
a sizeable increase in the number of students majoring in the Humanities.
Students also were asked to make forecasts about what the average student at Duke would
make in particular careers. We found that students are more likely to enter careers where they
expected the average Duke student to earn more than what the average student in the sample
expected. We also use the data from this latter set of forecasts to purge students’ forecasts about
their own earnings prospects in diﬀerent majors and careers and how their choices of a college
major would diﬀer from the choices of majors that they actually made. Our results indicate that
correcting for these forecast errors with the estimates from our model of college major choice
would lead to 7.5% of the students in our sample switching their majors.
The approach and ﬁndings of this paper about college major choice illustrates the potential
for using counterfactual expectations in choice models. Furthermore, following the strategy used
in this paper to elicit student probabilities of being in (or choosing) particular careers, represents
a potentially useful alternative to relying solely on data on observed discrete choices and earnings
to estimate conditional choice probabilities (CCP), the fundamental building block of structural
22dynamic discrete choice models.17 In future work, we plan to conduct a panel study to see how
individuals update their expectations over time. Updating would occur on their abilities to do
the coursework, the expected earnings in the various careers, and their preferences over working
in diﬀerent careers.
17See Manski (1993b), Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994) and Arcidiacono and
Miller (2009) for strategies for using observed choices and earnings to estimate conditional choice probabilities in
dynamic discrete choice models.
23References
[1] Arcidiacono, P. 2004. “Ability Sorting and Returns to College Major,” Journal of Econo-
metrics 121: 343-375.
[2] Arcidiacono, P. 2005. “Aﬃrmative Action in Higher Education: How do Admission and
Financial Aid Rules Aﬀect Future Earnings?” Econometrica 73(5): 1477-1524.
[3] Arcidiacono, P., E. Aucejo, H. Fang, and K. Spenner. 2009. “Does Aﬃrmative Action Lead
to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence,” NBER Working Paper 14885.
[4] Arcidiacono, P. and R. Miller. 2009. “CCP Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
with Unobserved Heterogeneity,” Working Paper, Duke University.
[5] Attanasio, O. and K. Kaufmann. 2009. “Education Choices, Subjective Expectations and
Credit Constraints,” NBER Working Paper 15087.
[6] Becker, G. 1993. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Ref-
erence to Education. 3rd edition. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
[7] Ben-Porath, Y. 1967. “The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings,”
Journal of Political Economy 75(4, Part 1): 352-365.
[8] Betts, J. 1996. “What Do Students Know about Wages? Evidence from a Survey on Un-
dergraduates,” Journal of Human Resources 31: 27-56.
[9] Brown, C. and M. Corcoran. 1997. “Sex Based Diﬀerences in School Content and the Male-
Female Wage Gap,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 99: 31-44.
[10] Daymont, T. and P. Andrisani. 1984. “Job preferences, college major, and the gender gap
in earnings,” Journal of Human Resources 19: 408-428.
[11] Delavande, A. 2008. “Pill, Patch or Shot? Subjective Expectations and Birth Control
Choice,” International Economic Review 49: 999-1042.
[12] Dominitz, J. and C. Manski. 1996. “Eliciting Student Expectations of the Returns to School-
ing,” Journal of Human Resources, 31: 1-26.
[13] Dominitz, J. and C. Manski. 1997. “Using Expectations Data to Study Subjective Income
Expectations,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 92: 855-867.
[14] Friedman, L. 1989. “Mathematics and the Gender Gap: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Studies
on Sex Diﬀerences in Mathematical Tasks,” Review of Educational Research 59: 185-213.
[15] Goldin, C., L. Katz, and I. Kuziemko. 2006. “The Homecoming of American College Women:
The Reversal of the College Gender Gap,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 133-156.
[16] Grogger, J. and E. Eide. 1995. “Changes in College Skills and the Rise in the College Wage
Premium,” Journal of Human Resources 30: 280-310.
[17] Hamermesh, D. and S. Donald. 2008. “The eﬀect of college curriculum on earnings: An
aﬃnity identiﬁer for non-ignorable non-response bias,” Journal of Econometrics 144(2):
479-491.
24[18] Hotz, V. J. and R. A. Miller. 1993. “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation
of Dynamic Models,” Review of Economic Studies 60(3): 497-530.
[19] Hotz, V. J., R. A. Miller, S. Sanders and J. Smith. 1994. “A Simulation Estimator for
Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice,” Review of Economic Studies 61: 256-289.
[20] James, E., A. Nabeel, J. Conaty, and D. To. 1989. “College quality and future earnings:
where should you send your child to college?” American Economic Review 79: 247-252.
[21] Kang, S. 2009. “Eliciting Expectations and Counterfactuals about College Major Choice:
Data Documentation” Working paper.
[22] Kaufmann, K. 2009. “Understanding the Income Gradient in College Attendance in Mexico:
The Role of Heterogeneity in Expected Returns to College,” Working Paper.
[23] Loury, L., 1997. “The gender-earnings gap among college-educated workers.” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 50: 580-593.
[24] Loury, L. and D. Garman. 1995. “College Selectivity and Earnings,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 13: 289-308.
[25] Manski, C. 1993a, “Adolescent Econometricians: How Do Youth Infer the Returns to School-
ing?” in C. Clotfelter and M. Rothschild, eds., Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher
Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[26] Manski, C. 1993b, “Dynamic Choice in Social Settings: Learning from the Experiences of
Others.” Journal of Econometrics 53: 121-136.
[27] Manski, C. 1999. “Analysis of Choice Expectations in Incomplete Scenarios.” Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty 19(1-3): 49-66.
[28] Manski, C. 2004. “Measuring Expectations,” Econometrica 72: 1329-1376.
[29] Manski, C., A. Blass and S. Lach. Forthcoming.“Using Elicited Choice Probabilities to Es-
timate Random Utility Models: Preferences for Electricity Reliability” International Eco-
nomic Review.
[30] Montmarquette, C., K. Cannings, and S. Mahseredjian. 2002. “How Do Young People
Choose College Majors?” Economics of Education Review 21: 543-556.
[31] Paglin, M. and A. Rufolo. 1990. “Heterogeneous Human Capital, Occupational Choice, and
Male-Female Earnings Diﬀerences,” Journal of Labor Economics 8: 123-144.
[32] Turner, W. and W. Brown. 1999. “Choice of Major: the Changing (Unchanging) Gender
Gap,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52: 289-313.
[33] van der Klaauw, W. 2000. “On the Use of Expectations Data in Estimating Structural
Dynamic Models: An Analysis of Career Choices,” UNC-Chapel Hill.
[34] van der Klaauw, W. and K. Wolpin. 2008. “Social Security and Savings and Retirement
Behavior of Low Income Households.” Journal of Econometrics, 145(1-2): 21-42.
[35] Wolpin, K. 1999. “Commentary on “’Analysis of Choice Expectations in Incomplete Sce-
narios,’ by C. F. Manski,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1): 67-69.
25[36] Zafar, B. 2008. “College Major Choice and the Gender Gap,” Working Paper.
[37] Zafar, B. 2009. “How Do College Students Form Expectations?” Working paper.
26A Appendix
In the survey, we also elicited from all students their preference orderings over all majors. These
orderings provide us with additional information with which to analyze how students determined
their choice of major. We ﬁrst examine the proportion of students who ranked their own major
as most preferred. These results are given in Table 13. Here we see that, while there is clearly
a strong positive correlation, many students do not rank their own major ﬁrst. This suggests
that some individuals are answering this question based upon what they enjoy outside of labor
market considerations. This is conﬁrmed in the next two tables where we estimate exploded
logit models of major choice. While the income measures are still signiﬁcant, they are about
half the magnitude of the estimates when actual major choice is used.
Table 13: Proportion of Students that Rank Own Ma-
jor First out of All Majors†
Freshman & Juniors &
Sophomores Seniors Overall
Science 0.857 0.824 0.839
Humanities 0.750 0.750 0.750
Engineering 0.833 0.619 0.697
Social Science 0.833 0.684 0.742
Economics 0.818 0.696 0.735
Public Policy 0.714 0.929 0.821
† Student respondents were asked: “Rank your preference for
the following ﬁelds, from the most preferred to the least. To
help you answer this question, we provide the list of majors and
their respective ﬁelds below.” and given a list of majors. Above,
we report the proportion that ranked their own major ﬁrst.
27Table 14: Exploded Logit Estimates of Major Choice†
Coeﬀ. St. Error Coeﬀ. St. Error Coeﬀ. St. Error
Natural Science -0.047 (0.133) -0.103 (0.140) -0.392 (0.188)
Humanities -0.018 (0.130) -0.266 (0.138) -0.367 (0.159)
Engineering -0.789 (0.140) -0.610 (0.150) -0.828 (0.198)
Social Science 0.335 (0.126) 0.026 (0.134) -0.045 (0.143)
Economics 0.038 (0.129) 0.123 (0.135) 0.062 (0.159)
Expected Ln Earnings 0.698 (0.185) 0.661 (0.197) 0.693 (0.221)
Aij = 3 0.771 (0.132) 0.774 (0.133)
Aij = 4 1.530 (0.147) 1.539 (0.148)
Aij = 5 2.408 (0.182) 2.437 (0.183)
Science Career 0.587 (0.398)
Health Career 1.218 (0.411)
Business Career 0.518 (0.376)
Govt. Career 0.250 (0.450)
Education Career 0.799 (0.541)
Log Likelihood 1093.2 980.4 975.2
† N = 173. The omitted major category is public policy. The omitted career category is law.
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